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Abstract
We analyse land transaction and residential development data from Beijing, China and 
identify that developers’ evaluation of land transaction exhibits reference dependence and 
loss aversion. Developers with prior land transaction losses set higher house prices than 
those without prior losses. This effect is strongest at the beginning and towards the end 
of the property sales period. It is moderated by developers’ ownership structure and list-
ing status. Privately-owned firms experience stronger effects than their state-owned coun-
terparts, whereas unlisted firms are more strongly affected than their listed counterparts. 
Results have implications on the relationship between the land and the housing markets in 
China. In a booming land market where land acquisition entails a high price, developers 
will transfer excess land price to house prices, thereby increasing the latter. The land mar-
ket plays an integral role in managing housing prices in China.
Keywords Reference dependence · Loss aversion · Behavioural economics · Real estate 
development · Chinese housing market
1 Introduction
Hedonic price models are routinely used to price residential properties. In such models, 
the pricing decision is assumed rational, and they only consider attributes that add value to 
properties. However, extant literature identified numerous behavioural factors influencing 
house markets, such as anchoring (Bokhari and Geltner 2011; Liu et  al. 2015), inatten-
tion (Kleven and Waseem 2013; Pope and Schweitzer 2011), risk salience (Fekrazad 2019) 
and loss aversion (Anenberg 2011; Bokhari and Geltner 2011; Genesove and Mayer 2001). 
 * Charlotte Chunming Meng 
 cm794@cam.ac.uk
 Helen X. H. Bao 
 hxb20@cam.ac.uk
 Jing Wu 
 ireswujing@tsinghua.edu.cn
1 Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge  CB3 9EP, UK
2 Hang Lung Center for Real Estate, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
1536 H. X. H. Bao et al.
1 3
Although these studies vary greatly in terms of geographic regions and behavioural fac-
tors, they have reached two consensuses: the inclusion of behavioural factors significantly 
enhances the performance of hedonic price models, and prospect theory is the most widely 
used and applicable behavioural model in this stream of research (see, for example, Barb-
eris 2013; Engelhardt 2003; Genesove and Mayer 2001). In this paper, we push the bound-
ary of behavioural research in real estate studies along these directions.
We focus on the behavioural factors of reference dependence and loss aversion, two 
well-documented concepts from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992). Reference dependence refers to people’s tendency of deriving util-
ity from a comparison with a reference point; loss aversion refers to people’s tendency of 
stronger reaction to losses than to equal-sized gains.1 In the real estate market, the two con-
cepts are helpful in explaining market cycles (Anenberg 2011; Bokhari and Geltner 2011; 
Genesove and Mayer 2001), household mobility decisions (Engelhardt 2003), REITs per-
formance (Bao and Gong 2016) and mortgage lender and borrower’s behaviour (Ong et al. 
2008, 2007), amongst others. However, most of the existing studies investigate individual 
or household decisions. Little is known if other market participants, such as real estate 
developers, are prone to such biases.
A typical residential property development project starts with real estate developers 
buying a plot of land and ends with them selling the properties developed on the plot. If 
developers price the properties rationally, then they would consider only the market value 
of the attributes in hedonic price model at the time of sales. Hence, land acquisition cost is 
irrelevant sunk cost. However, evidence from behaviour economics corroborates that peo-
ple are likely to evaluate consecutive events together if they experience prior losses in the 
first event, in the hope of breakeven (Barberis and Huang 2001; Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
If real estate developers are also affected by loss aversion due to previous land acquisition 
losses, then they are likely to pursue breakeven by setting the asking prices of their hous-
ing units above the fair market prices. The study of such behaviours are of economic and 
policy importance. Developers may want to pursue project-specific breakeven as much as 
they could. However, this is very difficult to achieve in competitive and volatile market 
conditions, and firm-level breakeven strategy should be adopted. Thus, the sunk cost of a 
specific project, i.e. losses due to excessive payment for a plot of land, should be written off 
and ideally offset by profits from other projects. This behaviour is closely related to myopic 
loss aversion and narrow framing in the behavioural literature, and the adverse impacts of 
such behaviours are well documented (Benartzi and Thaler 1995). Secondly—and more 
importantly—loss aversion leads to disposition effect and, subsequently, long time-on-mar-
ket and potentially high final transaction prices (Barberis and Xiong 2009; Odean 1998; 
Shefrin and Statman 1985). In the real estate development context, any pricing mistake 
(e.g. overpaying for a plot of land) is not corrected fully and timely in the subsequent sales 
of complete housing units. Therefore, policymakers should be wary of any loss aversion 
effect resulting from the land acquisition stage. Housing price regulations would most 
probably be effective if policies target the source of the issues, such as the overpricing of 
land.
We choose Beijing, China as our study area because it offers an ideal setting to test 
our hypotheses. The state owns all urban lands in China. Real estate developers can only 
obtain the right to use residential lands through public auctions of land leases from local 
1 Evidence from various fields has confirmed the key roles of reference dependence and loss aversion in 
human decision-making processes. For an excellent review about the applications, see (Barberis 2013).
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governments. This institutional setting offers two benefits to our analysis. Firstly, land 
prices are transparent and recorded accurately through the public auction platforms. Sec-
ondly, the limited supply of land parcels and the fierce competition in public auctions make 
it possible for developers to overbid, and consequently incur sizable losses in later stages 
of the development process. The highly supply-constrained market environment also allows 
loss aversion to demonstrate its effect. These features facilitate the reliable identification of 
loss aversion effect due to land transaction losses.
We analyse land and house transaction records from 2003 to 2014 and find that real 
estate developers’ pricing decisions for newly built properties exhibit reference dependence 
and loss aversion. When they pay prices higher than the reference land prices, they tend to 
set 14% higher house prices than developers without such losses. Loss from land acquisi-
tion transactions strongly affects developers’ pricing behaviour in the first year of the sales 
period.2 However, developers become rational as sales progresses into the second and the 
third year and when additional market information is taken in. The loss aversion effect is 
lowest at the third year of sales period, which is the average time to sell out housing units 
within a project in our sample. Our findings also confirm previous conclusions on disposi-
tion effect. We contend that the most loss-averse developers took the longest time to sell 
out their properties, i.e. eight years in our sample. These findings not only add to the fast-
growing behavioural literature in real estate research but also highlight the important role 
of land market in China’s housing market.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. A description of the theoretical framework 
is presented in Sect. 2, whereas the background information about real estate development 
in China is provided in Sect. 3. The details of our empirical implementations are described 
in Sect. 4, followed by the presentation of empirical results and several robustness checks 
in Sects. 5 and 6, respectively. Conclusions and proposals for future research directions are 
provided in Sect. 7.
2  Theoretical framework
We develop our empirical models based on prospect theory(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
which has been applied in a wide range of fields such as finance (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; 
Odean 1998), marketing (Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996; Hardie et al. 1993; Putler 1992; 
Ray et  al. 2015) and real estate economics (Anenberg 2011; Bokhari and Geltner 2011; 
Engelhardt 2003; Genesove and Mayer 2001), amongst others.3 The introduction of ref-
erence dependence and loss aversion is the most significant improvement that prospect 
theory offers to the standard economic literature. Reference dependence means that deci-
sion makers asses the value of a bundle of goods or services relative to a reference point 
rather than their absolute values. Loss aversion is the tendency of disliking losses more 
than favouring equal-sized gains. In the current study, we focus on these two elements, as 
illustrated in the following formula:
2 Sales period starts from the year when the project started to sell its units to the year when all of the units 
in the project were sold. Presales are not considered all sales in our database after construction was com-
pleted.
3 For a comprehensive review on this stream of literature, see Barberis (2013) and DellaVigna (2009).
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where x is the bundle of goods/services consumed; ref is the reference point; α and β take 
positive values between 0 and 1; and λ is the coefficient that measures the degree of loss 
aversion.
In the context of real estate development, prospect theory predicts that the reference 
points of real estate developers will affect their pricing decision. Moreover, their behav-
iours will be affected by loss aversion. Developers evaluate the outcome of land auctions 
by comparing transaction prices with reference prices (e.g. their expectation). This com-
parison will put the developer in either a gain domain if the transaction price is greater 
than the expectation, or a loss domain if the transaction price is less than the expectation. 
Prospect theory then predicts that developers’ behaviours are different in the two domains. 
Decision-makers tend to be risk seekers in the loss domain and risk aversive in the gain 
domain.
The concept of reference dependence is also related to a long-standing idea in the psy-
chology literature. This idea states that prior outcomes will affect people’s decision-mak-
ing afterwards. In principle, prior costs are sunk costs that are not recoverable. Therefore, 
future decision-making should not involve them. However, empirical evidence shows that 
decision-makers are influenced by sunk costs (Arkes and Ayton 1999; Arkes and Blumer 
1985). Behavioural economists further expand the idea of sunk costs to sunk losses and 
gains (for simplicity, we term both as prior outcomes hereafter). They also use prospect 
theory to explore the effect of prior outcomes. In the well-known study of Thaler and John-
son (1990), lab experiment evidence is obtained to show that people increase their risk-
seeking behaviour after a prior gain (house money effect) and tend to pursue breakeven 
after prior loss. Thaler and Johnson explained the results with quasi-hedonic editing rules. 
They argued that peole tend to segregate the prior gain from subsequent gains but inte-
grate the gain with subsequent losses (cancel-out). By contrast, they tend to integrate prior 
loss with subsequent gains (cancel-out) but segregate it from subsequent losses. People fol-
low these rules to reduce pain from the loss. Inspired by this paper, Barberis et al. (2001) 
defined loss aversion behaviour with the influence of prior outcomes. According to them, 
people are less loss averse after prior gain because the gain provides cushion for subse-
quent losses. Moreover, they experience increased loss averse after a prior loss because the 
loss heightens their sensitivity to subsequent losses.
This conclusion leads us to another concept for understanding prior loss effect: mental 
accounting (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Thaler 1985). The term refers to people’s cognitive 
process to think about, evaluate and organise economic outcomes. Therefore, when land 
transaction takes place, the developer opens a mental account to evaluate the transaction. 
In the following stage when developers set house prices, they might close the account for 
land transaction and open a new account for house sales, or they might integrate the two 
process and evaluate the two transactions in one integrated account. If developers use seg-
regate accounts, then land transaction outcomes should not affect developers’ asking price 
for houses. However, in the presence of integrated account, setting a high house prices 
would offer developers in the loss domain a chance to breakeven and reduce negative feel-
ings from the land transaction (Thaler and Johnson 1990). According to prospect theory, 
real estate developers are likely to use integrated account, especially in the loss domain. 
Losses from previous land transactions (paper/unrealised costs) will be considered in the 
(1)v(x) =
{
(x − ref )𝛼 , x ≥ ref
𝜆(ref − x)𝛽 , x < ref
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pricing decisions of housing units. Therefore, their pricing decision can be described by 
the following formula:
where Pit is the house price for properties on land lot i; Xi =
(
x1, x2,…
)� is a matrix of 
observable property attributes; t represents the time fixed effect; and 0 is a constant; 
lossi is the truncated differences between land transaction prices and developer’s reference 
points, as defined in Eq. (3).
where D(.) is a function that is equal to 1 when the condition in the bracket holds, and 0 
otherwise.
A typical hedonic price model includes the first three components in Eq. (2). The under-
lying assumption is that developers consider only the ‘house account’ when pricing hous-
ing units. When developers integrate ‘house account’ and ‘land account’, the gain/loss 
measure also enters the hedonic price model, as given in Eq.  (2). According to prospect 
theory and mental accounting, the losses and gains from land transactions affect real estate 
developers’ behaviours differently. If developers are in the gain domain (i.e. land acquisi-
tion costs are below their expectations), then they will behave rationally when determining 
the asking price of housing units completed on that plot. However, if land price is above 
their reference point, then they will suffer from loss aversion. They will also subsequently 
set high asking prices for new homes built on the land lot in the hope of breaking even. In 









> 0 . We use data from China to test these hypotheses in the succeed-
ing parts of the study.
3  The land market and real estate development in China
Before the 1990s, employers provided free housing for urban residents in China. All lands 
are owned by the state. Hence, a market for land transactions did not exist, and real estate 
development by private companies or individuals was impossible. In the mid-1980s, land 
reform successfully implemented the leasehold property right system in China. Under the 
new system, the government still owns all urban lands, but land use right can be leased 
to individuals or institutions. In the early 1990s, most lands were leased through private 
negotiation between the local governments and the buyers, which gave rise to corruption 
and led to unfair (often at lower prices) transactions. Since 2002, the government has man-
dated that all land transactions must be conducted publicly and transparently through auc-
tions, tenders or listings. Consequently, information regarding land transactions between 
local governments and developers is publicly available at government websites in real time 
nowadays.
During the same period of time, China also underwent another important reform—the 
tax-sharing reform or fiscal decentralisation. The 1994 fiscal tax-sharing reform reduced 
the share of local government in tax revenues significantly. Consequently, local govern-
ments turned to land leasing income to relieve fiscal distress (He et al. 2016). Land leasing 
revenue makes up over 50% of local government fiscal income between 2000 and 2018, 








× D(Referencepointi < Landpricei)
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according to the Ministry of Finance, China. Local governments rely heavily on land leas-
ing income for public finance. They are motivated to limit the supply of development land 
in order to boost house and land prices and subsequently their revenue from land leasing 
(Du and Peiser 2014). As shown in Fig. 1.1 and 1.2, the transaction volume and revenues 
from land use right transactions have been increasing steadily between 2008 and 2016.
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Figure 1.4 House & Land Price (National, yuan/m2 ) 
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Fig. 1  Real estate development in China.  Sources Wind and National Bureau of Statistics of China
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Although the local governments of third-tier cities had leased the largest amount of lands 
during this period, the revenue from land leasing was lower in comparison to that from 
second-tier cities. This is due to the low land prices in third-tier cities (see Fig. 1.3). Land 
transaction volume in first-tier cities remains low not only because most land lots in those 
cities have been developed already, but also because local governments in these cities are 
more motivated to limit the supply of development land. The unmet demand in first-tier cit-
ies escalated land prices from approximately 3000 yuan/m2 to 17,000 yuan/m2 in less than a 
decade (see Fig. 1.3). Figure 1.4 shows the national-level house and land prices. Whilst both 
prices increase consistently, land price has comprised much higher proportion in house prices 
in recent years. The land market plays an important role in the fast-growing housing market 
in China. Outcomes from land transactions can substantially influence real estate developers’ 
decisions in the later stages of the real estate development process.
Alongside the land reform was the gradual commercialisation of the housing market in 
China. Housing provision from the public sector gradually and steadily gave way to a fast-
expanding private housing sector. Real estate development projects mushroomed, firstly in 
coastal cities, and then quickly spread to inland areas. Figure 1.5 demonstrates the significant 
growth in the number of real estate developers from 2000 to 2008, especially in the private 
sector. Figure 1.6 shows the rapid growth of real estate investment in the same period, espe-
cially in the residential sector.
To develop residential projects, real estate developers need to lease land parcels from local 
governments, who are the sole providers of residential development land in China. In first tier 
cities such as Beijing, the competition in land auctions, tenders and listings are fierce, given 
the large number of developers and limited number of land parcels made available by local 
governments. Developers bid based on their predictions of future house prices (Wen et  al. 
2018). However, the significant mismatch of supply and demand inevitably pushed up land 
prices. It is not uncommon for developers to bid land prices to be above the expected house 
prices of nearby sites. Under this circumstance, it is possible for the successful bidder to suf-
fer a loss if future house prices are not high enough to cover the costs to complete the project.
In an efficient and free land market, if this happens the developer will have to write off the 
loss and move on. In China’s highly regulated land market, however, developers are likely to 
recover the loss by setting the price of completed units to be above the current market level. 
There is a feedback loop among land supply from local governments, land prices, and house 
prices. Specifically, high house prices will encourage local government to reduce land supply 
in order to push house price further up. Local government’s monopoly position leaves devel-
opers no choice but to pay high prices to secure land use rights in auctions/tenders/listings. 
Once developers have secured land use rights, they take the monopoly position as suppliers of 
housing units in the market. They will set the selling price of housing units as high as possi-
ble. Higher house prices will in turn encourage local government to further restrict the supply 
of land in the next round of land use rights sales. This feedback loop is self-reinforcing, and 
the result is double- or nearly double-digit house price growth rate for more than a decade in 
many first-tier cities in China. This trend and momentum encourage buyers to accept the high 
house prices set by developers, because the expectation is that house prices will keep such a 
rapidly increasing trend in the foreseeable future.
In summary, efficient market conditions will discourage or even eliminate loss aver-
sion, whist the highly supply-constrained market environment in China leaves room for loss 
aversion to demonstrate its effect. This is particularly true in Beijing, where land supply is 
extremely limited and house prices are among the highest in China. Therefore, we choose Bei-
jing as the test ground of our theoretical model. Further details of data from the study area are 
given in the next section.
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4  Empirical implementations
4.1  Data and the study area
We collect data from Beijing, the capital of China. Beijing has experienced a rapid popula-
tion growth and sprawled considerably in the last few decades. The number of registered 
residents jumped from 2.03 million in 1949 to 21.15 million in 2013, whereas the num-
ber of unregistered residents increased from 0.06 million in 1949 to 8 million in 2013.4 
The growing population density pushed the demand for residential property developments. 
Consequently, land prices and house prices soared rapidly. Figure  2 exhibits the annual 
residential land and house price indices and their growth rates from 2004 through 2015. 
House prices maintained high growth rate, except in 2011 when a package of governmental 
policies to control speculative investment and cool down the market was implemented.5 
Notably, land price rose as rapidly alongside house price. In six years out of the period 
examined, the growth rate of land price even exceeded that of house price. As such, land 
acquisition fee has become a major cost in real estate development. In 2000, land purchase 
cost accounted for only approximately 15% of the total investment in real estate develop-








































House Price Growth Rate Land Price Growth Rate
House Price Index Land Price Index
Fig. 2  House and land price indices in Beijing (Annual): 2004–2015. The left axis represents indices; the 
right axis represents growth rates. For both indices (left axis), 2004 = 100.  Sources House price indices 
are retrieved from National Bureau of Statistics of China. Land price indices are retrieved from Deng et al. 
(2012). Growth rates (right axis) are from authors’ own calculation
5 The examples of the policies are that, the down payment rate increased from 20 to 30% for all first-time 
home buyers; the mortgage rate discount declined from 30 to 15% of the benchmark interest rate; the same 
family would have to pay higher down payment and mortgage interest if purchasing second or third proper-
ties; mortgage loans to non-residents of a city were suspended unless they could prove that they have had 
paid taxes in that city for at least one year.
6 From Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (http://www.bjsta ts.gov.cn).
4 Data retrieved from Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (http://www.bjsta ts.gov.cn). The household 
registration system, or Hukou in Chinese, is the official system that identifies a person’s residency in an 
area.
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The first part of the dataset is the land transaction data from Beijing Municipal Com-
mission for City Planning and Land Resources Management (http://ghgtw .beiji ng.gov.cn). 
We collect records of 432 land lot transactions between 2003 and 2010. The information 
includes location, land area, construction area, floor area, land use type, benchmark price, 
transaction date, transaction price and the name of the real estate developer. We then match 
the land transaction data with monthly new home transaction records in Beijing from the 
Hang Lung Center for Real Estate of Tsinghua University. The matching gives 4899 home 
transaction records for 198 residential property development projects after dropping obser-
vations with missing values and incorrect records.7 Given the time lags from land transac-
tion to property sales, the matched sales records are in the time range of 2006–2014. For 
each land lot, we calculate the distance to the city center, the nearest underground sta-
tion, the nearest park, the nearest hospital and the nearest primary school with the location 
information. We also obtain real estate developers’ ownership structure and listing status 
information from https ://www.qicha cha.com.
The sample size is not large comparing with most empirical works because of the nature 
of the research question. However, the dataset has ideal representativeness. It covers 11 
Fig. 3  Land Transaction in Municipal Districts.  Sources Land transaction records are from Beijing Munici-
pal Commission for City Planning and Land Resources Management (http://ghgtw .beiji ng.gov.cn)
7 More specifically, we exclude records that have missing values and outliers (land prices or house prices 
three standard deviations away from the average price in the same development projects). We also exclude 
errorneous records that have house sales date earlier than land leasing dates.
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out of 16 administrative districts in Beijing.8 Figure  3 demonstrates the distribution of 
the observations amongst administrative districts.9 The total number of land transactions 
recorded in each district between 2003 and 2010 is represented by different shades of 
blue, with dark colors representing high transactions. The four districts in the city core, 
i.e. Xicheng District, Dongcheng District, Xuanwu District and Chongwen District, have 
the smallest land transaction volume during the sampling period. Land transactions—as 
a proportion of the total land sales in the whole city—range between 0.01% (Dongcheng 
District) and 1.5% (Xuanwu District) in these districts. This result is because the major-
ity of the land in the city core has already been fully developed or occupied with cultural 
heritages that are not allowed for redevelopment. Land transactions increase as the distance 
from the city center lengthens, such as in Daxing District (16.8%) and Fangshan (15.3%). 
We then overlay our sample points on the map with yellow crosses. The distribution of our 
sample points not only covers the most active parts of the land markets in Beijing but also 
resembles the geographical patterns of the population distribution closely.
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of variables that measure the characteristics of 
land, project and real estate developers. The average land price is 5617 RMB/m2 which is 
Table 1  Summary statistics of key variables
Variable name Definitions Mean SD Min Max
Land characteristics
DIST_CCT Distance to city centre (km) 21.77 10.12 1.37 54.85
DIST_UGS Distance to nearest underground station (km) 2.91 3.42 0.09 20.01
DIST_EPS Distance to nearest elementary primary school (km) 12.61 8.71 0.34 42.88
DIST_HSP Distance to nearest hospital (km) 12.59 8.25 0.12 37.90
DIST_PAR Distance to nearest park (km) 8.11 6.67 0.21 37.05
LANDAREA Land area (1000  m2) 90.44 79.28 1.72 638.00
FLOORAREA Floor area (1000  m2) 170.59 127.86 3.60 701.62
PUBLIC Commercial use included 0.34 0.48 0 1
COMMERCIAL Public use included 0.25 0.44 0 1
LPRICE Land price (1000 yuan/m2) 5.62 4.34 0.35 28.56
Project characteristics
DECO Average decoration cost (yuan/m2) 858.41 1,991.51 0 13,500
FAR Floor area ratio 2.09 0.79 0.49 6.34
FEE Property management fee (yuan/m2) 3.18 1.86 0.00 17.60
SIZE Average unit size  (m2) 121.76 52.22 55.84 393.00
HPRICE House price (1000 yuan/m2) 19.72 10.88 3.20 69.97
Developer characteristics
LISTED Listed 0.48 0.50 1 0
PE Private enterprise (All PEs in joint purchase) 0.44 0.50 1 0
JOINT Jointly purchased by more than one developer 0.19 0.40 1 0
8 Five districts, i.e. Mentougou, Yanqing, Huairou, Miyun, and Pinggu, are omitted due to data availability.
9 Chongwen and Xuanwu were independent administrative districts before 2010, and they were merged into 
Dongcheng and Xicheng, respectively in 2010. In Fig. 3, we still treat them as independent districts because 
our sample period is mostly before 2010. Thus, samples distribute amongst 13 districts in Fig. 3.
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about one-third of the average house prices (19,721 RMB/m2). The standard deviations are 
high for most of the variables and in some cases even higher than the mean, thereby indi-
cating the high heterogeneity amongst the development projects and developers.
4.2  Models
Following the theoretical framework, we describe the natural logarithm of developers’ ask-
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 can be found in Eq. (5), where Li is the actual 
land price; refi is the reference land price.
Xi is a vector of hedonic attributes of house prices. It includes physical characteristics 
such as decoration level when sold (DECO), floor to area ratio (FAR), property manage-
ment fee (FEE)10, and average size of properties (SIZE), as well as locational characteristics 
such as distance to city center (DIST_CCT ) and distance to subway station (DIST_SUB). 
According to the literature (Follain and Jimenez 1985; Sirmans et  al. 2005), DECO and 
FEE are expected to have a positive relationship with house prices; DIST_CCT and DIST_
SUB usually have a negative relationship with house prices; signs for FAR and SIZE11 are 
an empirical issue and differ in market settings. Some studies suggest that the shape and 
the frontage of land affect land prices (see, for example, Gao and Asami 2007). However, 
these factors are often omitted from hedonic price models when estimating land prices in 
high-density urban areas in China, where parcel shape and frontage are fairly uniform and 
regular. For example, in studies of land prices in Beijing (Ding and Zhao 2014; Yang et al. 
2015), Wuhan (Qu et al. 2020), and Hangzhou (Wen et al. 2018), neither the shape nor the 
frontage of land is considered in the hedonic price models. Following the practice in the 
literature, we do not include lot shape and frontage in our hedonic price models.
Yeari,t equals one in the year of sales in project i, and zero otherwise. Note that all sales 
in our database occurred between 2006 and 2014, and Year2006 is dropped as the base cat-
egory. Although the 2007/08 financial crisis brought the house price growth rate in China 
down to a record low in 2008, the negative effect is short-lived. Chinese government 
responded swiftly to the crisis by introducing a stimulus package of 4 trillion yuan (approx. 
$586 billion) in September 2008. China’s economy growth rate was boosted by 5–7% in 
2009 and the following years (Diao et  al. 2012). A substantial amount of this stimulus 
package went into the real estate sector directly and indirectly (see Table 1 in McKissack 
and Xu 2011, page 48). The Chinese government also introduced a series of plans to sta-
bilise house prices, such as lowering the one-year benchmark lending rate and deposit rate 
of financial institutions, reducing the minimum down payment ratio to 20%, and waiving 
property transfer taxes. As a result, housing prices rocketed by 9.5% in 2009, with growth 
rates as high as 70% year-on-year in some metropolitan areas (see the discussion in Dai 
et al. 2020, page 563). As a result, we do not consider the effect of the financial crisis in 
this study.
10 Property management fee is included because all properties in our sample are leasehold apartment units. 
It is an important determinant of house prices in China
11 Note that we use the house price per square meter as the dependent variable. If the total house price is 
used, the sign for SIZE coefficient is usually positive.
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We take all measurements at the project level. For instance, Pi is the average asking 
price of all saleable housing units in project i in the year of investigation.
In this specification, if 1 is substantially greater than zero, then prior losses are associ-
ated with high asking prices that developers set in the later stage of home sales.
Real estate development is a long and complex process, during which developers gener-
ally make constant adjustments to their strategies. This condition is particularly true during 
the sales stage of this process. Developers commonly sell housing units within the same 
project in phases, even if all units have already been completed. This approach allows 
developers to adjust listed prices such that any mispricing in previous sales could be cor-
rected. Investigating if developers can overcome loss aversion as additional market infor-
mation comes in (i.e. as sales progresses through multiple phases) is important. Therefore, 
we adopt two variations of Eq. (4) to investigate the initial effect of loss aversion and the 
overall effect of loss aversion throughout the sales period.
To investigate the initial effect of loss aversion, we consider sales in the first year of 
the sales period only. For project i, let t1 be the first year of the sales period. Section  6 
describes the model specification. Pi,1 is the natural logarithm of the average asking price 
of all saleable housing units in project i in the first year of the sales period12. Coefficient 
1 captures the isolated, net effects of loss aversion.t1 is the year fixed effects that captures 
the influences from any other factors that are not included in Xi.
To investigate the overall effect of loss aversion, we augment Eq. (4) to include sales in 
the whole project sales period, as shown in Eq. (7). In our sample, the maximum length of 
sales period is eight years (i.e. developers spent up to eight years to sell all units in their 
projects). We create eight dummy variables (i.e. Tj , where j = 1, 2, 3, … 8) to indicate the 
different years when sales occurred during the sales period. Note that the dummy variable 
for the first year of sales period is omitted from Eq. (7) because the effect has already been 
captured by t1 . We then create interaction terms between LOSSi and Tj to capture the effect 
of loss aversion, if any, in each year of the sales period. Tj is also included in Eq.  (7) to 
control for any other project-year specific effects other than loss aversion. Pi,n is the average 
asking price of all saleable housing units in project i in the nth year of investigation. If a 
project took N years to sell out all of its units, then a total of N observations will be created 
for this project, one for each of the year within the sales period.






1, refi − Li < 0
0, refi − Li ≥ 0




12  It is a common practice to use natural logarithm in empirical housing studies because house prices are 
usually right-skewed (see, for example, the discussion in Qu et al. 2020, page 3). We adopted this approach 
for the same reason
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The overall or accumulative effect of loss aversion for the whole sales period can be 
constructed with the coefficient estimates of LOSSi and its interaction terms in Eq. (7). If 
it took three years for a project to sell all the completed units, then the accumulative loss 
aversion effect in year one, two, and three can be calculated as ?̂?1, ?̂?1 + ?̂?2, and ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 + ?̂?3 
respectively.
4.3  Reference point determination
Identifying reference point is crucial for the estimation of Eqs.  (6) and (7). If the refer-
ence point is defined incorrectly, the developers might be placed in the wrong domain, 
and subsequently the measurement of losses could be wrong. This condition would render 
the whole analysis invalid. Unfortunately, prospect theory offers no clear guidance regard-
ing the identification of reference points. In real estate loss aversion literature, the most 
commonly used reference point is previous purchase (Anenberg 2011; Bokhari and Gelt-
ner 2011; Genesove and Mayer 2001; Leung and Tsang 2013). The advantage of such an 
approach is that previous purchase prices are observable and salient. However, this solu-
tion is not feasible for our analysis due to the very nature of land transaction and the land 
market in China because all of the land auctions in the country are the very first sales. No 
previous transaction information is available. To circumvent this data availability issue, we 
estimate the reference point by calculating the inverse distance weighted average price of 
comparable land transactions in the neighbourhood. The estimation steps are as follows.
For each land lot i, we firstly implement a radius search to identify comparable land 
sales. The choice of radius is important. A smaller radius gives closer and thus more com-
parable land parcels to land lot i. Nevertheless, a smaller search radius also can result in an 
insufficient number of parcels. Unfortunately, theories do not provide guidance on the exact 
specification of search radiuses. The choice of the cut-off distance is an empirical issue and 
can even vary among studies using data from the same geographic area. For example, both 
a 3 km and an 1 km radius are used in spatial analysis of house prices in Seoul, South 
Korea (Hyun and Milcheva 2018, 2019). We follow the practice in the literature by deter-
mining the search radius empirically. We explored various radiuses and found that the 5 
miles radius is the smallest one that gives sufficient sample size for our estimation. It pro-
vides a good balance between precision and robustness. We then identify a total of Qi com-
parable land transactions for land lot i within the 5 miles radius. Given that not all compa-
rable land sales occurred in the same year, we discount the prices to year 2003. The 
discount rate, denoted as ryear , is the cumulative land price growth rate between the year of 
land transaction (year) and 2003. For instance, for a comparable land lot j in 2007, if the 




We also use an inverse distance weighting method to aggregate the prices of the Qi com-
parable land transactions. The inverse distance weighting method ensures that closer trans-
actions have high weights, whereas transactions further away have their contributions 
diminishing with distances. Let kij =
1
distanceij
 , where distanceij is the distance between land 
lot i and a comparable land lot j. Accordingly, the 2003 price p∗
j
 has a weight of 









jLOSSi × Tj + i,n





 . The estimated comparable land price as of year 2003 is the weighted 







Lastly, we convert the 2003 weighted average price to the year when land lot i was pur-
chased, with ryeari . In sum, the formula to calculate the reference point is as Eq. (8).
5  Results and discussions
With the approach described in Sect.  4, we match each land transaction with transactions 
within a 5-miles radius and drop six land lots that have no comparable transactions. For the 
remaining 192 land lots, 12 comparable transactions emerge for each lot on average. We iden-
tify 82 land transactions in the loss domain and 110 in the gain domain. Table 2 contrasts 
land prices and house prices in the two domains. Whilst reference land prices are only slightly 
greater in the gain domain than in the loss domain, i.e. 5413 yuan/m2 and 5241 yuan/m2, land 
transaction price differences are much larger, i.e. 7458 yuan/m2 and 3745 yuan/m2. Thus, real 
estate developers in the loss domain purchase land lots of similar value at higher prices. The 
difference is great in the average house prices, i.e. 22,920 yuan/m2 and 16,907 yuan/m2, which 
is consistent with our hypothesis that developers in the loss domain set high house prices to 
pursue breakeven.
Table 3 presents the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of Eq. (6). The coefficient 
estimates of control variables and year fixed effects are significant with expected signs. For 
simplicity, we present coefficient estimates of key variables only in Table 3. In column (1), 
we present results by using all sample points. LOSS has a positive coefficient that is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. The coefficient confirms that developers compare land transaction with 
the reference price, and previous losses from land purchases affect their pricing decisions for 











Table 2  Land and house prices in the gain and loss domains
The unit for prices is 1000 yuan/m2
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. Loss domain
 # Comparable land lots 82 11.35 5.61 1 23
 Reference price 82 5412.66 2653.26 1210.38 12,574.76
 Land price 82 7457.50 3704.49 1498.00 18,014.00
 House price 82 22,920.57 12,379.52 3217.41 69,970.85
Panel B. Gain domain
 # Comparable land lots 110 12.25 5.19 1 25
 Reference price 110 5241.36 2650.09 1268.61 14,619.67
 Land price 110 3745.19 2240.85 347.00 12,523.00
 House price 110 16,906.57 7457.71 3688.53 43,420.94
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set asking prices for newly completed houses 10% higher than their counterparts in the gain 
domain.
5.1  Ownership
Existing evidence infers that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enter-
prises (PEs) behave differently, especially in their decisions directly associated with eco-
nomic profits. Under state controls, SOEs sometimes forgo maximum economic profit 
in the pursuit of social and political benefits. For instance, SOEs usually have excessive 
labour inputs (Boycko et al. 1996), and they are pressured to hire politically connected peo-
ple, rather than those best qualified (Krueger 1990). Thus, SOEs are less efficient and profit 
driven than PEs. SOEs typically have soft budget constraints and consequently less pres-
sure from losing money (Kornai et al. 2003). Even in financial distress, they can always 
rely on the state to bail them out. Thus, they are not sensitive to financial losses. However, 
PEs do not have the backing from the state, and have to take responsibility for the bad deci-
sions they made and the resultant losses. They should be responsive to prior losses. SOEs 
also have better access to external financing and lower cost of credit than PEs. They enjoy 
direct budgetary support from the government and preferential treatment by government-
owned financial institutions (Beck et al. 2006). Given the low cost of credit, a painful loss 
Table 3  Coefficient estimates of Eq. (6)
Standard errors in parentheses. Apart from the variables listed in the table, all regressions also include 
dummy variables for the transaction year. Their coefficients are significant and omitted from the table for 
simplicity
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Reference point Within 5 miles (inverse distance weighted average)
Sample (1) All (2) SOE (3) PE (4) Listed (5) Unlisted
LOSS 0.10*** 0.04 0.12** 0.06 0.16***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
DECO 3.97*** 3.04* 4.31*** 3.34** 4.24***
(0.98) (1.58) (1.33) (1.35) (1.18)
FAR 0.03 0.13*** 0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
FEE 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
SIZE 1.03** 0.63 1.01* 0.95 1.11**
(0.40) (0.68) (0.52) (0.58) (0.47)
DIST_CCT  − 2.33***  − 2.43***  − 2.17***  − 1.81***  − 2.83***
(0.28) (0.41) (0.37) (0.40) (0.35)
DIST_SUB  − 0.44  − 0.47  − 0.07  − 1.66* 0.47
(0.71) (1.12) (0.96) (0.99) (0.87)
Constant 8.89*** 8.69*** 8.96*** 8.91*** 8.94***
(0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15)
R-squared 0.86 0.91 0.85 0.85 0.89
Adj. R-squared 0.85 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.87
Number of obs 191 86 105 99 92
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to PEs may not be as painful to SOEs. Moreover, SOEs may have limited freedom to adjust 
property price than private firms, because SOEs are controlled mainly by the government, 
who are less likely to cause price inflation in local property markets. On this note, the loss 
aversion behavior of SOEs is somewhat controlled by the government while PEs are not. 
Consequently, state-owned developers may be less motivated to set high house prices and 
pursue breakeven. The manner in which firm ownership structure moderates loss aversion 
effect must be tested.
A Chow Structural Break test on Eq. (6) confirms that the coefficient estimates for SOEs 
and PEs are not identical. Consequently, we estimate Eq.  (6) using SOEs and PEs sub-
samples separately. The results are given in columns (2) and (3) in Table 3. We find that 
PEs are sensitive to losses. They set 12% higher asking prices when in the loss domain. 
However, no evidence of SOEs responds to land transaction losses. The results are in line 
with the existing literature as discussed previously. We conclude that the loss aversion pre-
mium estimated in the previous step, i.e. the 10% price increase estimated by using the full 
sample, is largely driven by the private sector.
5.2  Listing status
Development decisions are affected by developer’s financial conditions (Stein 1995). The 
land acquisition fee to developers is similar as the down payment to home buyers in that a 
considerable amount of fund is required at the early stage of investment. In order to afford 
their next land acquisition deals, financially constrained developers are likely to have rigid 
reservation prices and more averse to losses in the development project he is currently 
working on. Non-financially constrained developers, however, are not influenced in the 
same fashion. Instead, they prioritise completing current development project and selling 
houses promptly so that they can move on to the next investment opportunities. In this 
sense, they optimise profits on a project level but rather on a firm level. Hence, loss aver-
sion for non-constrained developers is small. To conclude, loss aversion level should be 
negatively related to developers’ financial condition. Given that developer’s financial data 
are not publicly available, we use their listing status to proxy their financial capability.
The extensive literature on initial public offering documents the relationship between 
stock listing and firm financial capability. These studies indicate that listed firms enjoy bet-
ter access to financial resources (Pagano et al. 1998), lower cost of credit (Pagano et al. 
1998) and enhanced financial flexibility (Beck et al. 2006; Schoubben and Van Hulle 2011) 
than unlisted firms. Therefore, we expect that firms that are listed on a stock exchange are 
less sensitive to losses than unlisted firms. Using the same strategy as outlined in Sect. 5.1, 
we test if listed and unlisted firms have different responses to prior losses. Again, a Chow 
Structural Break test confirms that the two types of firms behaved differently. We subse-
quently estimate Eq.  (6) for listed firms and unlisted firms respectively. The results are 
given in columns (4) and (5) in Table 3. Unlisted developers are more sensitive to losses 
than unlisted developers. They set asking 16% higher prices when they are in the loss 
domain. Listed developers, however, do not exhibit substantial loss aversion behaviour. 
Thus, the financial advantages provide listed companies with improved financial flexibility, 
and consequently cushions from temporary losses. The correlation between listed status 
and ownership structure in our sample is not high. For example, the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables is 0.4452; the proportion of listed companies is 77%, 33%, and 
52% for SOEs, PEs, and all companies combined, respectively. Therefore, the identified 
listing status effect is a separated issue from the ownership structure effect.
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Table 4  Coefficient estimates of Eq. (7)
Standard errors in parentheses. Apart from the variables listed in the table, all regressions also include con-
trol variables for property attributes, transaction years and sales duration. Their coefficients are significant 
and omitted from the table for simplicity
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Reference point Within 5 miles (inverse distance weighted average)
Sample (1) All (2) SOE (3) PE (4) Listed (5) Unlisted
LOSS 0.14*** 0.09 0.16** 0.11** 0.15*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
LOSS × T_2  − 0.08*  − 0.04  − 0.10*  − 0.09*  − 0.04
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
LOSS × T_3  − 0.10*  − 0.10  − 0.09  − 0.05  − 0.11
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)
LOSS × T _4 0.11  − 0.02 0.20** 0.08 0.11
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13)
LOSS × T _5 0.06 0.19 0.01  − 0.02 0.11
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19)
LOSS × T _6 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.06 0.36**
(0.15) (0.18) (0.21) (0.27) (0.16)
LOSS × T _7 0.28 0.13 0.58** 0.13 0.41**
(0.22) (0.33) (0.24) (0.42) (0.19)
LOSS × T _8 0.41** 0.48* 0.22 0.25 0.50**
(0.17) (0.26) (0.15) (0.21) (0.25)
Constant 9.90*** 9.60*** 9.91*** 9.94*** 9.82***
(0.15) (0.24) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22)
Project fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES
Sales duration fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.66 0.72 0.65 0.70 0.64
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.68 0.61
Number of Obs 742 328 414 365 377




















Year in the Sales Period
All PE
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5.3  Overall effect of loss aversion
In the previous section, we document that prior losses affect developer’s pricing strategy 
when the property enters the market. In this section, we further probe if this effect persists 
throughout the whole selling period with model specified in Eq. (7). We create one obser-
vation for each year of the project period, instead of only one observation in the first year 
of the project period in Eq. (6). The total number of observations in this step tripled from 
191 to 742 because the average sales period is 2.89 years. Given that observations from the 
same project are related, we use clustered standard errors to correct any potential biases in 
the estimation. Similar to the estimation of Eq. (6), we have controlled for project, year and 
sales period duration fixed effects.
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates of Eq. (7). We construct the accumulative effect 
of loss aversion over the entire project period based on Table  4, and plot the results in 
Fig. 4. SOEs are not included in Fig. 4 because the coefficient estimates of LOSSi are insig-
nificant across the board. The figure reveals a nonlinear relationship between the length of 
sales period and the effect of loss aversion on asking prices of newly completed apartments. 
If a project can sell out of its inventory within the first year, then the effect of loss aver-
sion is estimated to be 14% of overpricing. Hence, developers’ asking price is 14% higher 
than the fair market price. If it takes more than one year to clear the housing unit inven-
tory, developers become rational in pricing the apartments in later stages of the sales. This 
change is evident from the downward slope of all curves from Year 1 to Year 3 in Fig. 4. 
However, if it takes more than three years to sell out the units, developers will become loss 
averse over the time. This result is not surprising given the average length of sales period in 
our sample is 2.89 years. When a project takes longer than usual (i.e. 2.89 years or 3 years) 
to sell out, developers become anxious about recovering land transaction loss. This result is 
also consistent with the findings in the studies of disposition effect, which is caused by loss 
aversion. Hence, the ones who are most prone to loss aversion effect are the least likely to 
sell at a loss, and thus likely to have the longest sales period. Therefore, loss aversion effect 
is the largest for projects with the longest sales period (i.e. 8 years in our sample).
6  Robustness checks
6.1  Alternative reference point determinations
In their influential paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided a few candidates for ref-
erence point, such as the status quo, the expectations of decision makers and the formula-
tion of offered prospects. However, empirical difficulties arise when applying their theory. 
Specifically, reference points are often formed under the influence of heuristics and biases; 
they are unobservable, heterogeneous and possibly nonstationary (Allen et  al. 2017). As 
such, the determination of reference points an empirical issue, and no hard and fast rule 
exists. On the one hand, this situation encourages and enables researchers to identify a 
wide range of reference points. On the other hand, it requires most behavioural studies to 
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establish the robustness of their findings to different choices of reference points. In this 
section, we present results using an alternative definition of reference point in the estima-
tion of Eqs. (6) and (7) to verify the robustness of our findings.
We consider a rational version of reference point, i.e. land price valuation based on 
hedonic price modelling. Real estate developers are professionals who know their markets 
and products well. Their knowledge and experience will help them form the reference point 
based on their implicit estimation of the land prices, especially when land lots are in areas 
with less frequent transactions. We adopt hedonic pricing technique to capture this implicit 
valuation process based on land hedonic characteristics. This technique has been widely 
used in the studies of land prices13.
Table 5  Coefficient estimates of Eq. (7): alternative reference point
Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. Apart from the variables listed in the table, all regressions also 
include control variables for property attributes, transaction years and sales duration. Their coefficients are 
significant and excluded from the table for simplicity
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
Reference point Within 5 miles (inverse distance weighted 
average)
Hedonic valuation
Sample All SOE PE Listed Unlisted SOE PE Listed Unlisted
LOSS 0.14*** 0.09 0.16** 0.11** 0.15* 0.11* 0.13* 0.07 0.20**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
LOSS × T_2  − 0.08*  − 0.04  − 0.10*  − 0.09*  − 0.04  − 0.02  − 0.04  − 0.01  − 0.04
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
LOSS × T_3  − 0.10*  − 0.10  − 0.09  − 0.05  − 0.11  − 0.02  − 0.01 0.02  − 0.07
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10)
LOSS × T_4 0.11  − 0.02 0.20** 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.04
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11)
LOSS × T_5 0.06 0.19 0.01  − 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.07  − 0.00 0.13
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14)
Constant 0.14*** 0.09 0.16** 0.11** 0.15* 9.65*** 9.82*** 9.93*** 9.67***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22)
Project fixed 
effect
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sales duration 
fixed effect
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.66 0.72 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.75 0.68 0.75 0.67
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.65
Number of obs 742 328 414 365 377 298 397 344 351
13 It was developed from theory of consumer behaviour, which suggests that commodities are valued for 
their individual utility-bearing attributes or characteristics (Rosen 1974). Various studies have explored this 
model in terms of attribute selection (Geoghegan et al. 1997; Tse 2002), functional form specification (Hal-
vorsen and Pollakowski 1981) and possible biases involved in the valuation method (Dombrow et al. 1997). 
For recent applications, see for example, Polloni (2019) and Liang et al. (2020).
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The valuation-based reference point also attempts to mitigate the endogeneity problems 
in the comparable transactions method. The comparable transaction approach for reference 
determination bears the drawback that the difference between the reference transactions 
and the price of subject land transactions, i.e. the loss term, captures idiosyncratic charac-
teristics that might affect both the land prices and property prices. When the land transac-
tion price is lower than other transactions in the vicinity because the subject land parcels 
have some idiosyncratic characteristics, the perceived loss term is correlated with the prop-
erty price. The problem is largely mitigated when those characteristics are accounted for in 
the land valuation procedure.
We develop the valuation-based reference point by adopting a semi-log model specifica-
tion that is routinely used in the literature (Colwell and Munneke 1997). The model speci-
fication is shown in Eq. (9).
where Li is the natural logarithm of land price per square meter for land parceli;Yi is a k × 1 
vector of explanatory variables including locational attributes, physical attributes, land use 
and developer characteristics; Ti is a set of binary dummy variables which equals 1 only in 
the year of land transaction; 1 and 2 are coefficients to be estimated; i is identically and 
independently distributed errors.
The choice of independent variables and the estimates of Eq. (9) can be found in Appen-
dix. We then use the predicted land value as developer’s reference point, i.e. L̂i = refi and 
calculate the indictor of losses in Eq. (3) accordingly. Table 5 presents the new OLS esti-
mates. Loss coefficients have similar positive signs and are of similar magnitudes as in 
Sect. 5. Thus, the presence of loss aversion is confirmed. PEs and unlisted firms are still 
significantly loss averse, with coefficients of 0.13 and 0.20, respectively. SOEs and listed 
firms are still less loss averse than their counterparts. Therefore, our conclusion still holds 
that PEs and unlisted firms are more sensitive to losses than SOEs and listed firms.
The overall effect of loss aversion also exhibits nonlinear relationship with the year in 
the sales period, as demonstrated in Fig. 5. We did not report the estimated overall loss 
aversion effects for years 6 to 8 because observation numbers are insufficient (i.e. less than 
20 data points) to obtain reliable estimations. This condition is an inherent shortcoming 
for the hedonic price modelling approach, which is more data intensive than the weighted 
average comparable prices approach used in Sect. 5. Figure 5 suggests that the overall loss 
aversion effect decreases from year 1 to year 3, and gradually bounces up since the fourth 
year. The pattern is very similar to that in Fig. 4. Overall, our conclusions remain the same 
when the alternative definition of reference point is used.
(9)Li = 0 + Yi1 + Ti2 + i,
Fig. 5  Overall effect of loss aver-
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6.2  Alternative measurements of loss
In Sect. 4.2, we define LOSS as a dummy variable. This approach is adopted because the 
high multicollinearity between a continuous measurement of LOSS and its interaction 
terms with time dummy Tj  biases the estimation of Eq. (7). In this section, we re-estimate 
only Eq. (6) with the continuous measurement of LOSS (as defined in Eq. 3) to check the 
sensitivity of our findings to alternative definitions of LOSS. We firstly estimate the follow-
ing equation.
where DEVi is the deviation of the actual land price from the reference price, and LOSSi is 
as defined in Sect. 4.2. We include the squared term of DEVi to capture the nonlinear rela-
tionship between DEVi and Pi , if any. The results are given in Table 6. We include a bench-
mark model 1 in Table 6 to facilitate comparisons. It does not contain the squared term of 
DEVi to account for the nonlinear relationship. Model 2 is corresponding to Eq. (10) above.
Although model 2 shows signs of improvement over model 1, the coefficient estimates 
of DEV × LOSS and DEV2  × LOSS are not significant. This may due to multicollinearity, as 
indicated by the very high variance inflation factors (VIFs hereafter) for DEV × LOSS and 
DEV2 × LOSS. The model’s specification may not be flexible enough to capture the nonlin-
ear relationship between DEVi and Pi either. Specifically, developers may mentally classify 
gains and losses into small, medium, or large ones, instead of treating them as continuous 
variables. Hence, we split losses and gains into small, medium and large by their magni-
tudes with the 25th and 75th percentiles and estimate the following specification.
where LOSSsmall i = 1 if a developer’s expected loss is below the 25th percentile, 
LOSSmedium i = 1 if a developer’s expected loss is between the 25th and the 75th percentile, 
and LOSSl arg e i = 1 if a developer’s expected loss is above the 75th percentile. GAINsmall i , 
GAINmedium i , and GAINl arg e i are defined in the same way in the gain domain. The flexible 
functional form in Eq.  (11) can capture the effect of both loss aversion and diminishing 
marginal benefits. If the coefficient estimates of 1, 2, and 3 are negative and their abso-








| , or ||𝛼4|| > ||𝛼5|| > ||𝛼6|| , there is diminishing marginal benefits in the loss or 
the gain domain.
The results are given in the Model 3 column in Table 6. First, the coefficient estimates 
suggest both loss aversion and diminishing marginal benefits. The coefficient estimates in 
the loss domain are ?̂?1 = − 2.58 , ?̂?2 = − 0.51 , and ?̂?3 = − 0.19 . This means that for each 
additional RMB of expected loss, developers will raise the selling price by 2.58, 0.51, or 
0.19 RMB when the size of the expected loss is in the small, medium, or large range. The 
absolute values of these coefficient estimates are larger than their counterparts in the gain 
domain, which are ?̂?4 = 1.77 , ?̂?5 = − 0.10 , and ?̂?6 = − 0.08 , respectively. We found clear 
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Table 6  Coefficient estimates of Eq. (6) using alternative loss measurements
Standard errors in parentheses. Apart from the variables listed in the table, all regressions also include 
dummy variables for the transaction year. Their coefficients are significant and omitted from the table for 
simplicity
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1








DEV  − 0.18** 2.85  − 0.06 18.57
(0.07) (0.17)
DEV2  − 0.10 7.46
(0.15)
DEV × LOSS 0.10 2.80  − 0.14 23.77
(0.12) (0.40)
DEV2 × LOSS  − 0.03 11.06
(0.34)
DEV × LOSSsmall  − 2.58** 1.54
(1.02)
DEV × LOSSmedium  − 0.51** 2.30
(0.21)
DEV × LOSSlarge  − 0.19** 1.98
(0.09)
DEV × GAINsmall 1.77*** 1.60
(0.67)
DEV × GAINmedium  − 0.10 2.19
(0.18)
DEV × GAINlarge  − 0.08 1.98
(0.09)
DECO 3.77*** 1.38 3.68*** 1.41 3.72*** 1.39
(1.07) (1.10) (1.08)
FAR 0.04 1.47 0.04 1.48 0.05* 1.49
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
FEE 0.07*** 1.59 0.07*** 1.61 0.07*** 1.60
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
SIZE 1.32*** 1.69 1.33*** 1.70 1.31*** 1.70
(0.50) (0.51) (0.46)
DIST_CCT  − 1.81*** 2.34  − 1.84*** 2.42  − 1.84*** 2.37
(0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
DIST_SUB  − 1.54* 1.69  − 1.48 1.75  − 1.73* 1.72
(0.88) (0.96) (0.90)
Constant 10.02*** 10.01*** 9.94***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
R-squared 0.67 0.67 0.68
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.67
Number of obs 742 742 742
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Second, ||?̂?1|| > ||?̂?2|| > ||?̂?3|| in the loss domain. This supports the notion of diminishing 
marginal benefits, or developers’ response to loss changes decreases as the size of loss 
increases. In the gain domain, only the coefficient estimate in the small gain range is sig-
nificant and positive. It indicates that when gains are small, developers are motivated to 
increase prices. A plausible reason for the result is developers’ effort to secure a profitable 
position in a highly volatile market. Specifically, when expected gain is small the probabil-
ity of falling into the loss domain when market prices fluctuate unexpectedly is not negli-
gible. Therefore, developers in the small gain range will try to increase property prices to 
play it safe. This is not necessary when expected gains are in the medium or high range. 
Consequently, the coefficient estimates for 5 and 6 are not statistically significant (i.e., 
essentially zero). The overall pattern of these three coefficients still suggest the presence of 
diminishing marginal benefits, because the coefficient estimate in the small gain domain is 
the largest.
The findings are largely in line with results in Tables  4 and 5. Loss aversion is con-
firmed, and the effects of control variables are consistent across models. Our findings are 
not sensitive to alternative measurements of loss either. Although the model specifica-
tion in Eq. (11) is more flexible than that in Eqs. (6) and (7), and it also can facilitate the 
analysis of relationships in the gain domain, we did not adopt this specification in Sect. 4. 
This is because the VIFs for some of the variables, such as DEVi × GAINmedium i and 
DEVi × GAINlarge i are over 5 in Model 3 already. When time dummies Tj are added to the 
model, multicollinearity becomes too serious to obtain reliable estimates.
7  Conclusions
Using land transaction and apartment sales data in Beijing, this paper shows that prior 
losses from land transactions affect developer’s pricing decisions for new homes. The 
effects are also moderated by ownership structures and listing status of the developers. We 
find that SOEs or listed firms are not sensitive to prior losses in land transactions when 
pricing their newly completed apartments. The loss aversion effect is strong in the first year 
and towards the end of the sales period. Our findings add to the existing literature in the 
following ways.
Firstly, this paper contributes to the emerging behavioural research in the housing mar-
ket, a promising area that will improve our knowledge on the micro-foundations of the mar-
ket (Maclennan and O’Sullivan 2011). Whilst the presence of loss aversion in household-
level decisions has been proven, behavioural studies on real estate developers’ decisions 
are lacking. Developers play crucial roles in both the land and the housing markets. Cogni-
tive bias in their behaviours, if any, will potentially affect both markets. In comparison with 
the general public, real estate developers are more experienced and knowledgeable of the 
market. They work in groups and make decisions with higher stakes. Consequently, they 
are less likely to be affected by behavioural or cognitive biases (Charness and Sutter 2012; 
Cooper and Kagel 2005). Nevertheless, we identify strong evidence of reference depend-
ence and loss aversion amongst Chinese real estate developers. Thus, the persistence and 
robustness of reference dependence and loss aversion are confirmed as have been found in 
other studies (see, for example, Pope and Schweitzer 2011). We further contribute by iden-
tifying the time-varying feature of rationality, which is in line with the recent findings by 
(Glode et al. 2009) on mutual fund investors’ behaviour.
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Secondly, our findings also shed lights on ways to mitigate or even eliminate loss aver-
sion effects. As discussed previously, experience and high stakes cannot help real estate 
developers overcome loss aversion. Nevertheless, SOEs do not exhibit loss aversion effect 
at all, whilst listed firms are less affected than their unlisted counterparts. Thus an effective 
way for SOEs and listed firms to overcome loss aversion is to write off prior losses as sunk 
costs, partially or completely. Specifically, SOEs view losses from land transactions as 
sunk costs and write them off implicitly, knowing that the costs will be borne by the states. 
Therefore, their decisions about house prices are not affected by prior losses. Similarly, 
listed firms have better access to financing and are often of much larger scale than unlisted 
firms in China. They are more likely to recognise prior land transaction losses as sunk cost 
and behave more rationally in deciding the listing prices of new apartments. As such, the 
effect of loss aversion is overcome, albeit partially. This finding, once again, confirms the 
persistent nature of loss aversion. One cannot easily overcome loss aversion through prac-
tice or by using willpower. The most effective way is to write off the loss, or move the deci-
sion maker out of the loss domain.
Results also have implications for our understanding of the Chinese real estate markets. 
Whether high land prices are to blame for the overheating in housing market in China or 
not is a hot topic for debate (Glaeser et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2020; Wang and Zhang 2014). 
Although our paper does not answer this question directly, the findings deduce that land 
overpricing is likely to spillover to housing market. As developers are reluctant to write 
off losses from overbidding in land auctions, overpricing mistakes in land market will not 
be corrected in the pricing decisions in the housing market. This condition will push up 
the price in housing market accordingly. If the central government of China wants to cool 
down the housing market—which is one of the strategic priories in the recent five-years 
plan of the nation—then it should look upstream, i.e. the land market, to find an effective 
solution. Our findings present yet another evidence that the land and housing markets in 
China are closely intervened, and should not be studied or regulated in isolation (Bourassa 
et al. 2011; Kok et al. 2014).
“Chinese urbanisation and processes are so different from both western and other devel-
oping country experiences that it is difficult to subsume them.” (Hamnett 2020, page 697). 
Therefore, it is necessary to test established behavioural theories in Chinese context. Find-
ings from our study will be useful for policy makers and practitioners in other Chinese 
cities with similar market conditions. Meanwhile, a key finding in this paper is that govern-
ment interventions in the form of supply restrictions will provide fertile ground for behav-
ioural anomalies such as loss aversion. This is not a ‘Chinese characteristic’ anymore, 
because there are many regions and cities in other parts of the world, such as London, San 
Francisco and Hong Kong, where housing supply is significantly constrained by planning 
regulations and public housing policies. Our findings are relevant to the assessment of the 
behavioural aspects of urban planning and housing policies in those areas too.
Appendix
We follow the land valuation literature to select the independent variables in Eq. (9). The 
first group is the locational attributes, including the distance to the city centre, distance to 
the nearest amenities, i.e. underground station, primary school, park and hospital. They 
normally affect house prices negatively. The second group comprises two binary variables 
indicating land use restrictions, i.e. commercial use and public use. All land parcels in our 
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sample are restricted to residential development as the main land use purpose. However, 
some are allowed/required to have public use or commercial use too. Public and commer-
cial land will, on the one hand, improve the convenience in the neighbourhood which has 
positive effect on future house prices. On the other hand, they also drive up construction 
costs. These considerations are taken into account by the developers when they purchase 
the land parcel. We also include floor area rather than land area in the regression to repre-
sent lot size. In China, the maximum floor area ratio is always explicitly provided in any 
land-leasing contract and developers cannot construct over the floor area stated in the con-
tract. Thus, floor area is more informative than land area in showing the potential of the 
land parcel.
As for developer characteristics, we use a dummy variable to indicate private owner-
ship, as SOEs normally have stronger financial capability and flexibility to offer high land 
prices. Another important variable is a dummy variable for joint auction. When two or 
more developers purchase land parcels jointly, they have improved purchasing power so 
that they can bid high for favorable land parcels. Therefore, joint auction is a possible sig-
nal for high land price.
Table 7 exhibits the estimates of Eq.  (9). The models passed all standard diagnostic 
tests except the VIF (variance inflation factor) test for multicollinearity. The five distance 
variables are correlated. Multicollinearity leads to inflated standard errors and insignificant 
p-values. However, given that this issue will not affect prediction, which is our main pur-
pose of this analysis, we do not take further action to address this issue.
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Table 7  Land hedonic valuation 
estimates
Dependent variable is log land price. We also include dummy vari-
ables for the year of land transaction. Their coefficients are significant, 
but they are excluded in the table for simplicity
Explanatory variable Coef Std. Err
Distance to the city centre (m)  − 1.151 1.179
Distance to the nearest underground station (m) 2.398 1.325
Distance to the nearest primary school (m)  − 3.497 1.705
Distance to the nearest park (m) 2.089 1.035
Distance to the nearest hospital (m)  − 2.101 1.542
Floor-area-ratio 0.002 0.048
Commercial use  − 0.062 0.073
Public use 0.012 0.084
Joint action  − 0.060 0.084
Listed 0.160 0.075
Private enterprise 0.018 0.073
Constant 7.705 0.288
Number of obs 198
Adj. R-squared 0.65
1560 H. X. H. Bao et al.
1 3
Availability of data and material The datasets generated during and analysed during the current study are 
not publicly available but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflicts of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/.
References
Allen, E. J., Dechow, P. M., Pope, D. G., & Wu, G. (2017). Reference-dependent preferences: Evidence 
from marathon runners. Management Science, 63, 1657–1672.
Anenberg, E. (2011). Loss aversion, equity constraints and seller behavior in the real estate market. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, 41, 67–76.
Arkes, H. R., & Ayton, P. (1999). The sunk cost and Concorde effects: Are humans less rational than lower 
animals? Psychological Bulletin, 125, 591–600.
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 35, 124–140.
Bao, H. X. H., & Gong, C. M. (2016). Endowment effect and housing decisions. International Journal of 
Strategic Property Management, 20, 341–353.
Barberis, N. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 27, 173–195.
Barberis, N., & Huang, M. (2001). Mental accounting, loss aversion, and individual stock returns. Journal 
of Finance, 56, 1247–1292.
Barberis, N., Huang, M., & Santos, T. (2001). Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 116, 1–53.
Barberis, N., & Xiong, W. (2009). What drives the disposition effect? An analysis of a long-standing prefer-
ence-based explanation. Journal of Finance, 64, 751–784.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Maksimovic, V. (2006). The determinants of financing obsta-
cles. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25, 932–952.
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 110, 73–92.
Bokhari, S., & Geltner, D. (2011). Loss aversion and anchoring in commercial real estate pricing: empirical 
evidence and price index implications. Real Estate Economics, 39, 635–670.
Bourassa, S. C., Hoesli, M., Scognamiglio, D., & Zhang, S. M. (2011). Land leverage and house prices. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 41, 134–144.
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1996). A theory of privatisation. Economic Journal, 106, 
309–319.
Bronnenberg, B. J., & Wathieu, L. (1996). Asymmetric promotion effects and brand positioning. Marketing 
Science, 15, 379–394.
Charness, G., & Sutter, M. (2012). Groups make better self-interested decisions. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 26, 157–176.
Colwell, P. F., & Munneke, H. J. (1997). The structure of urban land prices. Journal of Urban Economics, 
41, 321–336.
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signal-
ing games. American Economic Review, 95, 477–509.
Dai, T. T., Jiang, S. Y., Sun, A., & Wu, S. H. (2020). Inequality and social capital: How inequality in china’s 
housing assets affects people’s trust. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56, 562–575.
1561Reference dependence, loss aversion and residential property…
1 3
DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 47, 315–372.
Deng, Y., Gyourko, J., & Wu, J. (2012). Land and house price measurement in China. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 18403.
Diao, X. S., Zhang, Y. M., & Chen, K. Z. (2012). The global recession and China’s stimulus package: A 
general equilibrium assessment of country level impacts. China Economic Review, 23, 1–17.
Ding, C. R., & Zhao, X. S. (2014). Land market, land development and urban spatial structure in Beijing. 
Land Use Policy, 40, 83–90.
Dombrow, J., Knight, J. R., & Sirmans, C. F. (1997). Aggregation bias in repeat-sales indices. Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14, 75–88.
Du, J. F., & Peiser, R. B. (2014). Land supply, pricing and local governments’ land hoarding in China. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 48, 180–189.
Engelhardt, G. V. (2003). Nominal loss aversion, housing equity constraints, and household mobility: Evi-
dence from the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 53, 171–195.
Fekrazad, A. (2019). Earthquake-risk salience and housing prices: Evidence from California. Journal of 
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 78, 104–113.
Follain, J. R., & Jimenez, E. (1985). Estimating the demand for housing characteristics: A survey and cri-
tique. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 15, 77–107.
Gao, X. L., & Asami, Y. (2007). Influence of lot size and shape on redevelopment projects. Land Use Pol-
icy, 24, 212–222.
Genesove, D., & Mayer, C. (2001). Loss aversion and seller behavior: Evidence from the housing market. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1233–1260.
Geoghegan, J., Wainger, L. A., & Bockstael, N. E. (1997). Spatial landscape indices in a hedonic frame-
work: An ecological economics analysis using GIS. Ecological Economics, 23, 251–264.
Glaeser, E., Huang, W., Ma, Y. R., & Shleifer, A. (2017). A Real estate boom with Chinese characteris-
tics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31, 93–116.
Glode, V., Hollifield, B., Kacperczyk, M., & Kogan, S. (2009). Is investor rationality time varying? 
Evidence from the mutual fund industry. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
Series, No. 15038.
Halvorsen, R., & Pollakowski, H. O. (1981). Choice of functional form for hedonic price equations’. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 10, 37–49.
Hamnett, C. (2020). Is Chinese urbanisation unique? Urban Studies, 57, 690–700.
Hardie, B. G. S., Johnson, E. J., & Fader, P. S. (1993). Modeling loss aversion and reference dependence 
effects on brand choice. Marketing Science, 12, 378–394.
He, C. F., Zhou, Y., & Huang, Z. J. (2016). Fiscal decentralization, political centralization, and land 
urbanization in China. Urban Geography, 37, 436–457.
Hyun, D., & Milcheva, S. (2018). Spatial dependence in apartment transaction prices during boom and 
bust. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 68, 36–45.
Hyun, D., & Milcheva, S. (2019). Spatio-temporal effects of an urban development announcement and 
its cancellation on house prices: A quasi-natural experiment. Journal of Housing Economics, 43, 
23–36.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Economet-
rica, 47, 263–291.
Kleven, H. J., & Waseem, M. (2013). Using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural 
elasticities: Theory and evidence from Pakistan. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 669–723.
Kok, N., Monkkonen, P., & Quigley, J. M. (2014). Land use regulations and the value of land and hous-
ing: An intra-metropolitan analysis. Journal of Urban Economics, 81, 136–148.
Kornai, J., Maskin, E., & Roland, G. (2003). Understanding the soft budget constraint. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 41, 1095–1136.
Krueger, A. O. (1990). Government failures in development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 9–23.
Leung, T. C., & Tsang, K. P. (2013). Anchoring and loss aversion in the housing market: Implications on 
price dynamics. China Economic Review, 24, 42–54.
Liang, C. M., Lee, C. C., & Yong, L. R. (2020). Impacts of urban renewal on neighborhood housing 
prices: Predicting response to psychological effects. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 
35, 191–213.
Liu, Y., Gallimore, P., & Wiley, J. A. (2015). Nonlocal office investors: Anchored by their markets and 
impaired by their distance. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 50, 129–149.
Maclennan, D., & O’Sullivan, A. (2011). The global financial crisis: Challenges for housing research 
and policies. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 26, 375–384.
1562 H. X. H. Bao et al.
1 3
McKissack, A., & Xu, J. Y. (2011). Chinese macroeconomic management through the crisis and beyond. 
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 25, 43–55.
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance, 53, 1775–1798.
Ong, S. E., Neo, P. H., & Tu, Y. (2008). Foreclosure sales: The effects of price expectations, volatility 
and equity losses. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 36, 265–287.
Ong, S. E., Sing, T. F., & Teo, A. H. L. (2007). Delinquency and default in arms: The effects of pro-
tected equity and loss aversion. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35, 253–280.
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., & Zingales, L. (1998). Why do companies go public? An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Finance, 53, 27–64.
Polloni, S. (2019). Traffic calming and neighborhood livability: Evidence from housing prices in Port-
land. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 74, 18–37.
Pope, D. G., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2011). Is tiger woods loss averse? Persistent bias in the face of experi-
ence, competition, and high stakes. American Economic Review, 101, 129–157.
Putler, D. S. (1992). Incorporating reference price effects into a theory of consumer choice. Marketing 
Science, 11, 287–309.
Qu, S. J., Hu, S. G., Li, W. D., Zhang, C. R., Li, Q. F., & Wang, H. (2020). Temporal variation in the 
effects of impact factors on residential land prices. Applied Geography, 114, 102124.
Ray, D., Shum, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2015). Loss aversion in post-sale purchases of consumer products 
and their substitutes. American Economic Review, 105, 376–380.
Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation in pure competition. 
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 34–55.
Schoubben, F., & Van Hulle, C. (2011). Stock listing and financial flexibility. Journal of Business 
Research, 64, 483–489.
Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: 
Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, 40, 777–790.
Sirmans, G. S., Macpherson, D. A., & Zietz, E. N. (2005). The composition of hedonic pricing models. 
Journal of Real Estate Literature, 13, 3–43.
Stein, J. C. (1995). Prices and trading volume in the housing market: A model with down-payment effects. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 379–406.
Thaler, R. H. (1985). Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science, 4, 199–214.
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The 
effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management Science, 36, 643–660.
Tse, R. Y. C. (2002). Estimating neighbourhood effects in house prices: Towards a new hedonic model 
approach. Urban Studies, 39, 1165–1180.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncer-
tainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
Wang, X. Q., Hao, L. N., Tao, R., & Su, C. W. (2020). Does money supply growth drive housing boom in 
China? A wavelet-based analysis. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 35, 125–141.
Wang, Z., & Zhang, Q. H. (2014). Fundamental factors in the housing markets of China. Journal of Housing 
Economics, 25, 53–61.
Wen, H. Z., Chu, L. H., Zhang, J. F., & Xiao, Y. (2018). Competitive intensity developer expectation and 
land price: Evidence from Hangzhou China. Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 144, 
04018040.
Yang, Z., Ren, R. R., Liu, H. Y., & Zhang, H. (2015). Land leasing and local government behaviour in 
China: Evidence from Beijing. Urban Studies, 52, 841–856.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
